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Mostashar 15 forex broker


mostashar 15 forex broker

15 And the "modem world is as Christian as it is un-Christian because it is the outcome Mirza Yusef Khan (Mostashar al-Dowleh), Amin al-Zarb, and Mirza. 15– Saïd Amir Arjomand - by the Iranian consul in Tblisi, Yusuf Khan Mostashar al-Dawla, in a short tract. At in the morning today, a public session of the National Consultative Haerizadeh: May God have mercy on the late Mostashar al-Dowleh Sadegh. ONLINE BETTING PICKS

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If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society. Sign in using a personal account Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. In another stipulation, the law essentially gives the security services and other executive-affiliated bodies the capacity to bar civilians from protesting in front of public offices.

The security services have expanded their use of the term secure zone to prevent any protest against legislative, executive, and judicial institutions that are responsible for public actions—institutions that across the world draw the attention of citizens with grievances and of constituencies harmed by public policies. The most serious of these measures is a draconian ban imposed in Article Seven on various types of protests. It prohibits participation in meetings, rallies, marches, and demonstrations that the government classifies as disturbing societal peace and as potentially resulting in the damage of public and private property, road blockages, and the prevention of other citizens from exercising their rights.

Article Seven also outlaws peaceful rallies, strikes, and sit-ins that could damage state-owned means of production or individual businesses. This ban negates the constitutionally enshrined and internationally sanctioned right to peacefully protest in streets and squares and to conduct strikes and sit-ins at work sites. The [protest] law essentially gives the security services and other executiveaffiliated bodies the capacity to bar civilians from protesting in front of public offices.

They grant police forces the authority to use batons as well as rubber and nonrubber bullets to disperse meetings, rallies, marches, and demonstrations that they deem unpeaceful. There has been some movement against this law since it was passed. As a result of human rights defenders, young activists, and the few remaining opposition parties continually demanding that it be annulled, the Supreme Constitutional Court SCC struck down Article Ten on December 3, This [article seven] ban negates the constitutionally enshrined and internationally sanctioned right to peacefully protest in streets and squares and to conduct strikes and sit-ins at work sites.

Notably, the SCC stated that the requirement for citizens to notify the security services of their intentions to demonstrate is not designed to empower the government to restrict a constitutional right. The ruling says that only a competent court in accordance with due process could apply such a restriction. This could have implications in areas other than demonstrations, particularly nongovernmental organization NGO registration.

It could force the government to go to court to prevent an organization from gaining official status rather than the current practice of rejecting registration applications and forcing applicants to engage in lengthy litigation to reverse the decisions. If the security services are determined to restrict demonstrations, however, the surviving articles of the Protest Law give them wide-ranging legal powers to do so. For instance, they can still ask a court to ban peaceful demonstrations in squares, roads, and work sites and close to state buildings and public offices.

And the provisions regarding the use of force still stand. To that end, legal tools have been adapted extensively. In , an NGO law was enacted that essentially allowed the government to restrict the establishment of NGOs, subject them to heavy bureaucratic control represented by the Ministry of Social Solidarity , and limit their funding—thus generally compromising the independence of civil society. The law also endowed the executive authority—represented by the security and intelligence services—with extensive tools for surveilling, interfering with, and disrupting civil society activities.

Following their coup, the generals initially made no attempt to amend this law. In the winter of , however, the legislature—the House of Representatives—replaced this NGO law with a new piece of legislation targeting civil society. This has reemphasized the rubber-stamp role of Parliament as an enabler of the new authoritarianism in Egypt and is yet another attempt to eliminate the freedom of association enshrined in the constitution.

However, it also gives the ministry the power to decline registration without judicial approval for a litany of reasons. Some of these reasons are technical, such as the lack of application data pertaining to the founders. These [legal] stipulations aim to separate NGOs from labor and trade unions in need of civil society support to defend the rights and freedoms of their members. The new legislation adds other restrictions as well. NGOs that engage in activities reserved for political parties have traditionally been banned; such activities include encouraging citizens to join a specific political party, promoting a certain candidate in an election, or raising funds for a specific election campaign.

The new legislation also includes a ban on organizations that intrude on the domains of labor and trade unions and professional syndicates. Moreover, it bars organizations from forming in areas that are labeled harmful to the nation. These stipulations aim to separate NGOs from labor and trade unions in need of civil society support to defend the rights and freedoms of their members. They leave the unions more vulnerable to repressive measures if they oppose official policies.

The lack of objective legal definitions creates additional avenues for repression and subjects civil society activists to permanent threats of bans, criminalization of their practices, and other punishments. All of this contributes to a prevailing fear of being targeted. Additional articles are designed to eliminate the autonomy of NGOs and subject them to full-scale security control.

These efforts have pushed civil society in Egypt to the brink of extinction, with some organizations closing or leaving the country. This agency is dominated by high-profile ministers, including the ministers of defense, interior, justice, and foreign affairs, as well as other potentially concerned ministries. A number of high-profile organizations also have representatives in the agency, including the General Intelligence Directorate, the Egyptian Central Bank, and the Administrative Control Authority.

It oversees all the financial transactions of both domestic and foreign NGOs. The agency monitors the transfer of funds from international NGOs to their offices in Egypt, the receipt of foreign funds by domestic NGOs, and donations to NGOs from groups and individuals both in Egypt and abroad. It requires NGOs to provide a confirmation of expenditure to ensure that approved funds are spent for the approved purposes.

The agency can veto these requests outright, and if it approves the requests, it retains the right to retract the approvals later, ensuring the full control of funds both retroactively and proactively. The new authoritarian regime can diminish the funds that domestic NGOs use to perform the economic, social, developmental, and charitable functions on which many people depend. Because of these gatekeeping roles, the agency has become a rogue authority—one that will likely discourage Egyptian citizens from donating to Egyptian NGOs.

In this way, the new authoritarian regime can diminish the funds that domestic NGOs use to perform the economic, social, developmental, and charitable functions on which many people depend. The agency threatens NGOs with surveillance, penalties, and criminalization at all levels: registration, planning and execution of activities, domestic and foreign fund raising, and the collection of donations.

NGOs can be targeted at any level if their actions do not align with the interests of the security services. The NGO legislation virtually eliminates freedom of association and threatens the survival of civil society as a foundational pillar of stability and prosperity. It also is on track to drive the few foreign NGOs that remain out of Egypt and constrict any cooperation left between them and their domestic counterparts.

Compounding the pressure on civil society is a bundle of legal and administrative measures enacted prior to the new NGO legislation. For example, the government revoked the license of the Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture—one of the most active rights groups in Egypt—citing administrative violations.

On September 21, , Sisi amended Article 78 using his interim legislative prerogative in the absence of Parliament. Equally unorthodox in legal terms is the lack of an objective, substantive definition of the contraband addressed in Article Article 78 blurs the lines in many ways. It subjects NGOs working on rights and freedoms to the same surveillance and criminalization as proven participants in acts of terror, violence, and espionage.

There are no clear-cut and substantial differences between acts of terrorism and violence rightfully classified as hostile acts on the one hand and the legitimate activities of rights groups documenting human rights abuses and defending victims on the other.

A terrorism law was also issued, in addition to several amendments designed to augment the jurisdiction of the military court system in a manner that undermines the rule of law and threatens the safeguards of basic rights and freedoms. This law further enables the government to legally surveil and penalize those individuals and organizations who peacefully oppose official policies and practices.

The law creates an environment in which accusations of terrorism can be used without legal restraint against opponents of the new authoritarianism. This is because the law encompasses the same vague terms and concepts that have come to be the main feature of lawmaking since the coup. The criminal circuit courts are required to adjudicate requests within seven days of the state prosecutor filing the necessary paperwork. The law also does not clearly identify the paperwork necessary for requesting the classification of an entity or individual as a terrorist.

This deprives the listed entities and individuals of their constitutional and legal right to a fair trial prior to conviction. Listed entities and individuals can experience a wide spectrum of potential effects: the confiscation of organizational and financial assets, the revoking of NGO licenses; the banning of enrolled individuals from travel and seizing or annulling of their passports; the stipulation that these individuals have legally lost the good reputation necessary to hold office; and based on that, the barring of them from running for public and parliamentary positions.

The law mandates that these actions be taken immediately following placement on the terrorist lists. The law stipulates that the army shall assist the police force in securing and protecting public institutions, offices, and facilities. It justifies this mandate by stating that these sites—including public universities and government-owned industrial facilities—and all the activities unfolding in and around them fall under the jurisdiction of the military court system for the duration of the protection period, which is left unspecified and can therefore be extended endlessly.

The main mechanism of intimidation associated with the law has been civilian referrals to military tribunals, which are infamous for their lack of transparency and safeguards for fair litigation. The government has systematically conflated peaceful public assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, sit-ins, and other protest activities occurring at public sites protected by the army with acts of violence.

This contradicts the constitutionally enshrined right of each citizen to be tried by his or her natural judge—that is, in a civilian tribunal. There is no judicial body that can rein in military jurisdiction, so prosecuted individuals are deprived of the safeguards of their rights and freedoms that are part of litigation in civilian tribunals. More than 7, civilian cases were referred to military courts between and The Role of the Elected Legislature From early to September , the House of Representatives ratified the protest and terrorism laws; the amended military court law; and the amended Penal Code, including Article In fact, the House of Representatives approved without revision or even substantial discussion out of presidential decrees issued by interim president Adly Mansour and the current president, Sisi.

These acts of submission to the executive branch of government run counter to the spirit of the oversight prerogatives bestowed upon the legislature in the constitution, which calls for serious deliberations prior to the ratification of presidential decrees. These moves indicate that the legislature is loyal to the executive, a loyalty that was imposed by the dominant role the military establishment and security and intelligence services played in managing the parliamentary elections in and manipulating their results.

The speaker of the House of Representatives—a legal expert by training—lauded parliamentarians for ratifying presidential decree laws in record time, not exceeding fifteen days per law. According to various human rights organizations, the number of those detained and imprisoned between and is almost 60, In the summer of , the Muslim Brotherhood was at the core of what the government designated enemies of the nation. A few hours before the July 3, , military coup that overthrew an elected president from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, several leaders of the Brotherhood were imprisoned.

The list included former president Morsi, his aides, high-ranking members in the Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party, and leaders and high-ranking members of other like-minded movements and political parties. Arrest warrants for Islamist leaders continue to be issued, with the objective of weakening the movements and discouraging recruitment.

The security services have tortured some Islamist prisoners and detainees and neglected the medical needs of others, leading to their deaths in places of custody. After the coup, the military and the security services used excessive force to end protests by Brotherhood supporters and did not shy away from shedding blood. They used armored bulldozers and snipers, shooting protesters with live ammunition in their heads, necks, and chests.

The terrifying result has been labeled a massacre in which almost 1, Egyptians were killed. Neither the police, nor the military, nor government decisionmakers were held accountable for the massacre, criminally or politically. Alongside state-sponsored violence and brutality, the new authoritarian government has used various legal and judicial instruments to repress the Muslim Brotherhood and opposition Salafi groups. In September , a court ordered the movement banned and its financial assets frozen.

Harsh prison sentences, including mass death sentences, have been issued without adherence to the principles of the rule of law and fair trials. It also has resulted in a wave of mass migration of Brotherhood members to regional and other international destinations.

All this has been unfolding in a public space void of freedom of expression and injected with government-backed hate speech and hysterical hostility toward the Muslim Brotherhood. Using the media, the government has placed under the umbrella of enemies a number of human rights activists and pro-democracy civil society leaders who have been trying to draw attention to the deteriorating human rights situation in Egypt since These charges allowed him to be punished under the Terrorism Law.

Gaafar was also charged with receiving international bribes, which qualifies him for punishment under Article 78 of the Penal Code. Gaafar remains in custody as of late ; his bribery case is pending investigation. Similarly, lawyer Negad El-Borai was summoned for questioning before multiple judicial bodies in and because of his involvement with Egyptian judges and lawmakers in the drafting of an anti-torture law.

The agreement ceded sovereignty over the islands to Saudi Arabia, after being managed for decades by the Egyptian authorities. It includes other individuals who defend human rights and freedoms, such as the lawyers Malek Adly and Haitham Mohamadein.

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The spread is the difference between the bid and ask price and it is indicated in pips. Even though pips are the smallest measurement with which a price can move either up or down, it can make the difference between a profit and a loss, no matter how great or small. Spreads are typically applied in forex trading rather than a fixed rate or a commission. It would seem logical for traders to choose a broker that offers the lowest spreads from a cost-effective point of view.

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