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Star ratings are based on patient responses to 5 questions about the care they have received from their provider. Responses are measured on a scale of and the average score is displayed in an easy to view, 5-star format. These included the Ponchos Rojos, a dissident Aymara indigenous group from the western highlands, coca growing peasants from the Yungas region, sections of the state-owned mining unions, and transport unions.
What about forces on the left and in the popular movement? How did they respond? Other popular sectors were also independently aligned against the government, either out of spontaneous discontent over perceived electoral fraud, or for longer-standing grievances, many of them legitimate yet ignored. The feminist organization Mujeres Creando has also mobilized against the government over its failure to act in the wake of accelerating gender violence and one of the highest proportional rates of feminicide in the continent.
Other indigenous territorially-based organizations in the lowlands have been on the frontlines of disputes with the government over its failure to consult indigenous communities properly prior to initiating development projects, in partnership with multinational capital, for extractive industries such as mining and natural gas extraction.
None of these grievances is minor. None was heard. Independent Left and indigenous opposition to Morales and MAS was incidental to the post-electoral course of events. Similar to Brazil in and thereafter, even mobilizations that included popular sectors were quickly channelled and led by the far-right. This was movement capture with a vengeance. This, too, was predictable, and is to be explained in part by their near-total incorporation into the apparatuses of the state, their bureaucratization and pacification in that process, and the lost capacities for critical independence, autonomy, and mobilization.
Again, the parallels with Brazil and the PT spring to mind. The right seems to have taken advantage in these circumstances to press their demands with increasing violence. What have they done? Five were civilians, one was a police officer. On Sunday evening, November 10, Camacho was paraded on top of a police car through the streets of La Paz, escorted by mutinous police and accompanied by cheering supporters of the opposition.
Police in Santa Cruz removed the Wiphala from their uniforms. Once again, the Brazilian example looms large. Thus, if there is accompaniment by civic organizations I will accept, but if some other path is chosen, I will also accept. She was then made president of the senate and then immediately declared president of the republic. Other than Pumari, there were no indigenous faces in the photo. The first formal meeting she called as president was with the commanders of the Bolivian Police and Armed Forces.
This was followed by a congratulatory tweet from Carlos Mesa. To summarize: the two short-term catalysts for the coup were the perception of fraud in the October 20 elections—a perception Mesa helped create prior to the elections and then systematically reinforced thereafter—and the backdrop of the February referendum. The mobilizations were predominantly composed of an alienated urban middle class, although they included popular sectors and the lumpenproletariat, i.
Although sections of the independent left and indigenous movements had legitimate grievances with the government, these did not shape post-election political dynamics. Centrist discontent was channelled and led by the far-right, under the figure of Camacho, ultimately with the support of the police and the military, which proved decisive.
Bureaucratized and hollowed out during almost 14 years of MAS rule, popular organizations aligned with the government were unable to respond quickly and independently, and with sufficient force to challenge the reactionary tide that pulled the extreme center under its sway.
They still exist as organizations with mass memberships, and we will soon see what capacity for sustained opposition remains. No one has challenged the fact that Morales won a hefty plurality of votes in the first round.
Stepping back from the immediate conjuncture of elections and the coup, what do the medium-term dynamics look like? We cannot make sense of the latest events unless we account for the reverberation of the global crisis of capitalism into Bolivia and the contradictions of the political-economic model of extractive neodevelopmentalism. In his first speech in exile in Mexico, Morales emphasized these achievements.
Since , if not earlier, economic policy and political coalitions have hinged on agreements with finance, multinational hydrocarbon capital, and foreign and domestic agro-industrial capital in the eastern lowlands. In terms of finance, the Morales period saw enormous gains for national banks, whose assets increased 3. The logic of large-scale, foreign capital in the extractive sectors runs alongside the growing power of an indigenous and popular petty bourgeois layer. In addition to this nucleus, there is a wider layer of passive electoral supporters from the dominated classes.
The more modest the income, the more likely to be indigenous, and the more likely to support Morales in elections. Down from a recent high of 6. The subsidizing effects of extractive rent distributed to different circuits of capital in other more labour-intensive sectors of the economy manufacturing, agriculture, construction, tourism, and so on , relatively low unemployment, and targeted cash transfers to the poorest has meant very significant improvements in poverty levels, as indicated above.
All of this is important to explaining the enduring popularity of Morales, as is the fact he is the first indigenous president in a majoritarian indigenous country since the founding of the republic in When discussing his government in interviews and speeches, these are the achievements Morales touts. Yet the Bolivian economy, of course, is highly sensitive to broader trends in the world market and has been drying up its foreign exchange reserves and leveraging debt in order to sustain public spending and disguise the underlying reality, especially in the last year or so of pre-electoral preparation.
As in Brazil, the neodevelopmental model has suffered from an exaggerated dependence on primary commodities, an overreliance on imports that have become cheaper with an overvalued currency, and an associated decline in non-traditional and manufacturing exports. We cannot over-emphasize the fact that formerly independent social movements and trade unions were co-opted, divided, and absorbed into the state apparatus—or worse, as in the case of lowland indigenous movements—maligned as agents of the right and of empire.
The socio-ecological devastation of the current drive for capitalist modernization will intensify. How have the different classes, populations, and political forces on the left and right responded? Prior to the elections, these organized against an eventual Morales victory.
Similar to what happened in Brazil under the PT, due to the promotion of popular and indigenous sectors in Bolivia, urban middle class people perceived that their status had been undermined during the course of the Morales years. Indigenous people were incorporated into the state bureaucracy in proportional numbers for the first time, cutting off one common traditional employment route for lighter-skinned middle class professionals.
The geography of social life and consumption patterns changed, as spaces once exclusive to white-mestizo middle and upper class layers were relatively democratized — shopping malls, airports, and so on. The subsidized gondola transport system in La Paz, for example, made the route from popular-indigenous El Alto to the posh southern end of the city a cheaper, easy and quick commute.
Meanwhile, the various fractions of capital had never found in Morales and the MAS a natural political home. In the first few years of MAS rule, organizations like CAINCO, the main commercial and industrial business confederation of Santa Cruz, organized an all-out destabilization campaign to overthrow the government. Once that was defeated in , however, they entered into a pact with the government, together with agribusiness interests, as well as foreign hydrocarbon and mining capital.
Finance capital had a similar relationship to the Morales government. As in Brazil under Lula, as long as profitability was high, and viable right-wing political alternatives were unavailable, they learned to live with the Morales government.
However, since , economic conditions have worsened, despite surface growth. Under these circumstances, capital began looking for an exit behind the scenes, and have fallen in behind this coup, supporting the new, unelected president. As we have suggested, many of the core social-organizational infrastructures that underpinned the extraordinary left-indigenous cycle of contention in the period have been weakened through their subordinate incorporation into the state over the Morales period.
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